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THE VANITY OF GOD 
Charles Taliaferro 
Christian theism gives rise to what may be termed the problem of Divine vanity. The God of 
Christianity seems to be vain with respect to matters of creation, worship, and redemption. 
God's creating beings in His own image is akin to an artist creating self-portraits. The 
Divine command (or invitation) that these image-bearers worship Him seems to be the 
height of egotism. In matters of redemption, God still insists upon being in the limelight, 
the talk of the town. This prima donna God does not seem very self-effacing. In "The 
Vanity of God" I articulate and reply to the charge that God is vain. 
An objection to theism which has received scant attention in the literature may be 
called the problem of divine vanity. It may be argued that Christian theism exults 
in a view of God as vain, egoistic, pompous. The problem of vanity arises in three 
general (broad) areas, creation, worship, and redemption. With respect to cre-
ation, God's bringing into existence creatures in His likeness is akin to bringing 
into being self-portraits, which is hardly a humble undertaking. God appears to 
be a super Narcissus who delights in His own retlection. Worship seems inescap-
ably egoistic. God has not only created images of Himself, but expects these 
images to worship Him, to recount many of His greatest deeds, to be abased 
before the Divine glory and adore Him. We are even commanded to worship none 
other than God. Similarly, in salvation history God insists upon being at the cen-
ter stage. Creature1y moral failure is offensive to the Creator. But instead of crea-
tures succeeding in effecting reconciliation, God Himself does so. God may have 
taken on human tlesh to bring about redemption, but it is still God qua divine and 
human ego who is the principal saving agent. God wants to be the talk of the town. 
The problem of vanity may be considered a part of the general problem of evil 
as well as a problem for Christian ethics generally. It is part of the problem of evil 
in that it appears to attribute to God what Christians take to be a vice. Christians 
imagine God to be completely good, morally perfect and supreme, whereas the 
charge of the vanity objection is that He is morally inferior to His saints. This cre-
ates a problem for a Christian ethic charging us to be perfect even as our heavenly 
Father is perfect. If we follow our Maker's example, we find ourselves condemned 
by the Christian understanding of God's ordinances. God appears to tlaunt pre-
eminently the very vice God is said to abhor. I begin with preliminary retlections 
on the relationship between pride and humility and then address the problem of 
vanity under the headings creation, worship and redemption. 
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Pride and Humility 
Vanity is a fonn of pride. Christian ethical tradition is united in its condemnation 
of vanity, but it has not always condemned pride qua self-respect or proportionate 
self-regard. Common parlance appears to support a distinction between acceptable 
and unacceptable pride; it even reflects a quite positive approval of natural pride. 
Thus, in the use of the expression "false pride," there is some suggestion that 
real, true pride is appropriate. "False pride" is this proportionate pride in appear-
ance only, in the same fashion as "false humility" and "false friends" are humility 
and friends only in appearance. When someone has false pride they have passed 
beyond proportionate self regard or respect and landed themselves in egocentrism, 
vanity, self-aggrandizement. Even so, ordinary language is ambivalent on the 
matter and "pride" simpliciter may stand for either proportionate or dispropor-
tionate self-regard, a term of approval or condemnation. Ethicists have identified 
the fonner as natural or proper pride. An Aristotelian account of natural pride 
is that it consists in feeling a proportionate amount of pleasure in one's undertak-
ings, character or relationships. Vanity involves excessive, disproportionate 
delight as when one takes enonnous pleasure in one's appearance, a pleasure 
which eclipses any appreciation of others, and so on. 
Something like the Aristotelian account seems satisfactory, though it may be 
objected that vain pride or proper pride can be constituted principally by one's 
beliefs and not involve any feeling of pleasure and pain. Thus, a vain person 
may be one who tends to believe the very best of herself and the very worst of 
another. The Aristotelian account is not thereby utterly vitiated, however, for it 
seems to be essential to pride that the prideful person takes some pleasure in, 
or has a positive attitude toward, the object of pride. At the very least, it would 
be puzzling for Miriam to be prideful about X, unless she took X to be something 
worthy of positive regard or some pleasure. In this paper I assume an Aristotelian 
account of pride; pride involves some positive regard or attitude, whether or not 
this also involves sensory pleasure. 
Vain pride does not appear to be solely a matter of havingfa/se beliefs about 
oneself. One may give great credit to oneself which is undeserved and not thereby 
be prideful, for one's exalted self-estimation may be grounded upon weighty 
evidence. Imagine Miriam has been told by otherwise reliable authorities she is 
the best pianist in the world. Reluctantly she believes this, but she is reticent to 
infonn others, blushes when she thinks of her greatness and the like. In fact, 
she is a horrific piano player and the authorities are amusing themselves by 
inculcating false beliefs in innocent pianists. Miriam has self-aggrandized beliefs, 
but she is not vain. Vain pride appears to involve a willful self-exaltation, a 
self-promotion that is unwarranted. To put the matter in epistemic tenns, we 
expect a humble person to employ Cliffordian standards with regard to herself 
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and William James-type, charitable standards to others.' Thus, if Miriam is 
humble we might expect her to believe the best of another in a case where the 
evidence if far from overwhelming and be reluctant to believe the best of herself 
without some more justification. Surely a humble person need not have Cartesian 
skepticism about all her positive features. Such pyrrhonism may amount to 
servility. Be that as it may, we typically expect the healthy, humble person to 
have a modest degree of self doubt. I do not take such self doubt to be a defining 
feature of humility. I note simply that its absence is common among those in 
the grip of vain pride and its presence is common among the humble. 
Vain pride and natural pride may range over many areas. One may take pride 
in one's scope of power, some characteristic or undergoing or even some relation-
ship which is believed to be positive. Likewise one may have humility with 
respect to some relationship, characteristic, quality, degree of power or under-
going which is believed to be positive. A marked difference between the prideful 
and humble is that the humble person is aware of the limited nature of these 
features. As it happens, two people may have identical features, both having 
the same degree of intellectual prowess say, and yet one has pride in the degree 
attained whereas the other is humble in appreciating the modesty of that degree 
r she recognizes the comparative paltry value of such intellectual achievement 
over against the witness of saints]. In this example we can see the close proximity 
of humility and proper pride. It may even be that a steadfast refusal to feel proper 
pride could stem from a misunderstanding of humility. A humble person may 
be one who knows (or has justified beliefs) that she has qualities of a certain 
sort and no better, but she does not thereby deny that she has the limited qualities 
she enjoys. 
Two further aspects of pride and humility may be noted before treating the 
objection from vanity. First, while pride seems to be incompatible with feeling 
sorrow or pain in the feature one is proud about, humility is compatible with 
feeling such sorrow. If we are proud of getting a grant, it cannot be that we take 
sorrow or feel unmitigated pain and dismay over the windfall. However, if we 
feel humility about our moral character, having a vivid sense of past and future 
failings, it is possible to feel unmitigated pain and dismay over these failings. 
Humility need not involve pain and sorrow in this sense, but it is compatible 
with it. Second, pride, whether natural or unnatural, appears to involve some 
kind of self-regard or self reflection in an essential way. To be proud that X 
occurs must involve some belief or attitude relating oneself to X. I cannot be 
proud of the moon unless I have some belief or attitude tying myself and the 
moon together, however attenuated the tie. 2 Thus, I may be proud that my God 
made it or that it is part of my universe. Humility may involve self-reference, 
indeed a poignant, sharp self-awareness. But it might also be that the humble 
person is very unself-conscious. One who is humble may have 'died to self' and 
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have a marked self disregard or self-forgetfulness of the kind some of us have 
only rarely as when we 'lose ourselves in a book' and the like. 
Initially it is difficult indeed to imagine that the God of Christianity could be 
humble. God is conceived of as limitless in power and knowledge, the principal 
Creator of all, morally perfect, and unsurpassable in all perfection. Surely it is 
hard to be humble if you are God, and still harder to imagine the God of 
Christendom is humble when one considers the specific teachings examined 
below of creation, worship and redemption. Recall the refrain of a popular 
country song: "it's hard to be humble, when you're perfect in every way." We 
reproach each other with the accusation that so-and-so acts with a "holier than 
thou" attitude or "she thinks she is God." But what of the moral fiber of a being 
who actually is holier than ourselves? 
I dismiss two ways of avoiding these questions at the outset. One is to claim 
that God could not be vain because God is not a being. 3 There is an important 
theistic metaphysics identifying God as Being itself. If this metaphysical scheme 
is correct and only beings can be egotistic and vain, it follows God cannot be 
vain. This will not settle the vanity objection for me, however, as I do not accept 
such a reading of theism. Even if the vanity objection were put to rest in such 
a fashion other problems would then arise about our attributing a range of features 
to God theists have been wont to do, e.g., loving, compassionate, just, and the 
like. The Being tradition endeavors to apply such terms to God in an analogical 
sense, but if these terms may be analogically applied, so might vanity. In any 
event, I elect to face the vanity objection from the standpoint of identifying God 
as a being, not Being. This allows the vanity objection to be advanced in a 
strong form and presumably a defender of the alternative God-as-being 
metaphysics can draw upon the results, if successful, in arguing it is inappropriate 
to attribute vanity to God, in both a univocal as well as analogical sense of 'vanity.' 
I also will not appeal to a second way to undercut the vanity objection, namely 
claiming God lacks feelings. The doctrine of divine impassibility has been taken 
to deny God has feelings of pain and pleasure. If vain pride involves feeling 
inordinate pleasure in one's own features, presumably a being incapable of any 
feelings of pleasure at all, cannot have vain pride. I accept a version of theism 
which allows that God has feelings like pleasure and pain, albeit I do not construe 
these as somatic or bodily undergoings. In section III this distinction is clarified. 
It may be noted, too, that even contemporary defenders of Divine impassibility 
have not denied God experiences some emotion. In an important recent work, 
Divine Impassibility, Richard Creel argues God experiences pleasure but not 
sorrow.4 
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Creation 
Creation of Divine image bearers as traditionally conceived may appear to be the 
height of vanity. God is pictured as creating the cosmos for his own glory and crea-
tures are brought into being who are images or reflections of God. They are even 
called to so act that they come into an increasing likeness to their Maker. Certainly 
this suggests an extraordinary delight in self. The iconography of pride identifies 
the mirror as one of vanity's principal instruments. Isn't the Christian God one who 
loves His own reflection so much that creation is but His looking glass? 
The critic may urge further that an appeal to God as Trinity does not suffice to 
avoid the objection from vanity. The triune life of God might appear to be a supreme 
model of other-regarding love and self-donation. The Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
are continuously united in will, forever expressing loving regard for the other. 
However this is spelled out, the objection of vanity can be raised in terms of the 
vanity of the Trinity itself. After all, a club of three members might behave in a 
chauvinistic, aggressively self-concerned manner even though each member of the 
club behaves in a perfectly other-regarding fashion to his or her fellow member. 
Similarly, the objection from vanity is not altered by recent discussion as to whether 
creation by God is voluntary as a freely chosen act or necessary as an act which was 
free only in the sense of being not forced by a third party, but otherwise was a neces-
sary manifestation of God's nature as goodness. S All such discussion might settle is 
the quandary whether Divine vanity is a freely elected vice or that God is vain by 
His very nature. 
I think that the objection from vanity is less forceful with respect to creation 
than with respect to worship and redemption. Briefly, a reply to the critic lies 
in a fuller appreciation of the nature of creation, the metaphysical distinction 
between God and creatures, and what is meant by being created in God's image. 
If classic Christian metaphysics is correct, then God is the only causal agent 
who could be responsible for there being a contingent cosmos at all. It is a 
necessary condition of the existence of any contingent object that God exercises 
his creative conserving power sustaining it in existence. For God to lovingly 
interact with another, He must create it. Presumably both loving another and 
acting haughtily before another, requires that the other be created and conserved 
by God. Bare creation and conservation of a being does not entail God is vain. 
God was not in the position of excluding lots of other gods from creating, failing 
to wait His tum in line. To alter slightly one of Peirce's dictums: gods are not 
as plentiful as blackberries. Likewise it appears that neither God's failing to 
create nor creating entail God is vain. Just as creating may well be a necessary 
condition to loving, other-regarding encounter, so failing to create need not entail 
God is vain, for while God as trinity may (as the critic charges) image some 
ghastly mutual self-congratulatory club, it certainly need not do so. We can 
imagine treating the triune Godhead as a society of love in which other-regard 
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ingness reigns and, while accompanied by proper pride insofar as there is genuine 
delight in the relations and features of Godhood, it is not in excess (one is hard 
pressed to imagine excess here) and such self-delight is hardly a matter of harming 
possible creatures. Failing to create does not entail God is vain. Nor is it the 
case that God is vain because He creates. 
But why create in one's own image? Not everything in the created order is 
characterized as a divine image; there are rivers, mountains, volcanoes, and 
rocks. Only in the biological world, and specifically among sentient, thinking, 
active beings do we find any singling out of creatures who are Divine image 
bearers. And it is here that we may note the marked difference between a creature 
painting endless self-portraits and the Divine creating in His image. In the latter 
case, God brings into existence agents, creative beings distinct from Himself. 
Self-portraits do not love or hate their Maker and their fellow God-portraits. Our 
self-portraits do not hate and love, nor possess emotions in any literal sense. 
Creatures who are thinking, feeling agents bear a marked similarity to their 
creator, but it is in precisely the ways that allow them to have a life in some 
way independent of their maker. We, as image bearers, are not unlike Goethe's 
description in Faust, "little gods in the world." 
But consider the following objection. Imagine a mad scientist, Arthur, who 
populates the world with thousands of clones. Despite the fact these clones are 
able to live in measured independence of Arthur their creator (Arthur the 500th 
can insult the original Arthur), isn't there something unseemly egoistic about 
our mad scientist's creation? Is God's creating us in His likeness analogous to 
Arthur's cloning creatures that resemble himself? 
Yes and no. What appears to be unseemly in the thought experiment is that the 
mad scientist's cloning amounts to his producing creatures who narrowly resemble 
himself, in gender, size, race, weight and personality features. Whatever their sub-
sequent exercise of free will, the Arthurs are homogeneous; they are modeled after 
a limited, perhaps flawed, original. If we alter the thought experiment and suppose 
that Arthur produces a rich variety of creatures, the ego resemblance is lessened 
and there is less suggestion of egoism in his creative work. God does not have a 
specific race, gender, size or weight to copy. Divine image bearers are persons, 
whatever their dimensions. Moreover, it is good for there to be persons, beings 
that enjoy sensation and desires and who can exercise reason, memory, imagin-
ation, and agency. Thus, it is plausible to regard the creation of such beings as 
good whether it be by Arthur or God. Our resemblance to God consists in our 
enjoyment of good making powers like agency, the capacity to love and the like; 
powers enabling us to be co-creators with God. Prominent Christian philosophers 
have identified the chief resemblance between God and Divine image bearers as 
the possession of will. That which makes us in God's image is that which enables 
us to have a will (and thus a life) independent of God (St. Bernard, William de 
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Saint Thierry, Richard Saint-Victor, Rene Descartes, Jean-Luc-Marion). I con-
clude that creating other agents is not by itself vain , though it may appear vain if we 
imagine the Creator has brought them into existence solely to complement and 
praise Himself. Earlier I noted that one rationale for creation is to glorify God. 
Insofar as God is glorified simply by there being good, created states of affairs, the 
problem of vanity does not arise. But what if part of what it means to glorify God 
is to praise and worship Him? Is one of the reasons for our creation the bestowing 
of "metaphysical compliments" (Hobbes' phrase) to the Almighty? 
Worship 
If creation alone does not clinch the critic's case, Christian teaching of worship 
seems to do so. Isn't it the height of Divine egoism to insist creatures worship 
and praise God? 
I place to the side one solution to this charge, namely the view that worship 
of God is to be understood solely in terms of creaturely regarding behavior. That 
is, to worship God is simply to behave as good Samaritans or in a Christ-like 
fashion to others. Surely any full account of Christian worship must take this 
into account, but I believe that there remains a distinct Christian teaching that 
God is to be praised and adored, which is not fully reducible to good creature-to-
creature ethics. 
A reply to the objection of vanity may be seen by a fuller appreciation of the 
nature of God's attributes and the character of worship. 
There is an interesting dispute going back to Plato over whether when one 
loves another, Miriam loving Eric say, Miriam is loving Eric's properties or 
Eric himself. Eric may well ask Miriam whether she loves him for his wealth 
or his body or his wit. Would she love him if he lost these? I will not tease out 
the subtleties of this debate, the puzzles that arise if Miriam were to claim to 
love Eric independent of any such properties ("Eric, I just love bare particulars," 
she might say). There are indeed serious problems with delimiting admirable 
from undesirable forms of conditional and unconditional love. What I wish to 
note here is that for an Anselmian theist the problem does not arise about whether 
one would love God if God were to lose one of his perfections. Perhaps it would 
be a defective form of fickle human love if Miriam ceased loving Eric when he 
lost his money. The case of God is different, however, for His metaphysical 
funds cannot be lost. Traditional Anselmian theism holds that God possesses 
His properties essentially. Thus, God could not but be limitless in power, knowl-
edge and goodness. In fact, the subtle doctrine of Divine simplicity holds that 
the relationship of divine attributes is so close that a perspicuous theistic 
metaphysics treats these attributes as distinct only from a creaturely standpoint. 
Really, the Divine nature is simple, without any parts, and these different Divine 
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features are different only in the sense that the Divine manifests itself differently 
to the world, in some respects as omniscient knowledge (God's foreknowledge) 
and omnipotent power (God's providence) and so on. While Eric and Miriam 
may debate about whether each would love the other if there was a loss of money 
and health, the Divine object of love cannot (of metaphysical necessity) lose His 
richness and life. 
To worship and adore God involves, in part, delighting in what we take to 
be the Divine properties. To love God is not to love some guy who happens to 
be very wise, but it is to love, adore and delight in supreme Wisdom, Goodness, 
Knowledge and Power. The question does not arise whether we would still 
worship God if God were to lose Goodness, Wisdom, Knowledge and Power. 
A being that could lose these in toto would simply not be God. Thus, one 
important point here is that worship is not directed primarily at an ego (or three 
egos) but at the instantiation to a supreme degree of various perfections. We do 
not love a Divine bare particular. Compare the dictum about creatures: we should 
love the sinner and hate the sin. Whatever may be thought about loving sinners, 
I do not think we can love God without loving the Divine properties. To love 
and delight in the Divine properties is to love God. 
The value of worship may now be better appreciated. Worship of God does 
not check creaturely narcissism because of fear that a bigger narcissist will be 
jealous. Rather, in worship one's attention is drawn to the features which make 
up the Divine Nature and constitute its excellence. It is a good thing for humans 
to contemplate things of high, even supreme worth. The Divine perfections are 
limitless and worthy of unending delight and pleasure. There is a beauty to the 
holiness of God. Conceivably, the prevention of creatures contemplating and 
adoring the divine properties may even harm them. God's self-love and our 
worship is not so much a matter of some fellow being lucky enough to get the 
Divine features while others did not-and we are stuck with delighting in his 
features. Our devotion is to the Divine perfections themselves, co-instantiated 
supremely in a person and so coinstantiated (or constituted) that no other being 
could have them. Much Christian spiritual literature draws attention to a kind 
of disinterested or self-forgetful character in the high adoration of God. W. H. 
Auden once commented on the Narcissus myth that its lesson lies in Narcissus 
delighting in the retlection being his, and not simply in the features themselves. 6 
This may be further illustrated by a complementary case described by Thomas 
Nagel. Nagel contends that his apprehension of the badness of pain, indeed a 
pain he is feeling, does not rest essentially upon his apprehension that the pain 
is his own. 
"Of course he (a sufferer) wants to be rid of this pain reflectively-not 
because he thinks it would be good to reduce the amount of pain in the 
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world. But at the same time his awareness of how bad it is doesn't 
essentially involve the thought that it is his. The desire to be rid of pain 
has only the pain as its object. This is shown by the fact that it doesn't 
even require the idea of oneself in order to make sense: if I lacked or 
lost the conception of myself as distinct from other possible or actual 
persons, I could still apprehend the badness of pain, immediately."7 
In a similar vein we may imagine delighting in certain excellences without smug 
self reference. 
Can God be humble in His self-delight and summoning creatures to enjoy 
Himself? God knows his great making features with clarity and precision; He 
could not think of Himself as being just one of the gods, no better than the next 
god. Return to a point made above about humility. Humility does not seem to 
be characterized solely or even essentially by having self-degrading views of the 
self. On the contrary, the entertainment of false beliefs about oneself is typically 
associated with arrogance (see, for example, "The Parson's Talk," Canterbury 
Tales). It would appear to be an instance of false humility for one to believe 
worse of oneself in the face of evidence one has positive features, evidence 
which would satisfy Clifford in his most epistemically compulsive moods. God's 
self love may be understood to express proper pride, not vanity. 
There is a dictum common to authorities in the Christian spiritual tradition 
that we are to love God not for what He does for us, the rewards we might gain 
from it, but to love God for His own sake. Indeed this is true, but as they also 
note, the reward and fulfillment to be found from a non-reward conscious religious 
life is great. There is a sense in which such God-love is akin to God's love of 
Himself as traditionally conceived, for He does not love Himself for rewards 
like money or enslaving servile creatures. We may not conclude from our discus-
sion of worship that God is vain, for Divine self-love and creaturely love is 
directed upon the divine excellences and perfection. Such may be in the domain 
of proper pride, but not egotism and false pride.· Insofar as knowledge, power 
and goodness are real goods and worthy objects of enjoyment, God's love of 
these features is itself a good. We may understand Divine self love in a fanciful 
way as goodness loving itself. 
Consider a final objection. When I love God I am loving a person (or three 
persons), not their properties of goodness per se and so on. I love and reverence 
a person who discloses Himself to me in religious experience. Theistic essen-
tialism is by no means universally accepted. Some hold that God can lose His 
omnipotence and omniscience, albeit by His own choice. I can still love God 
even if He should lose these supreme features. Therefore my love of God cannot 
be accounted for as an intentional attitude directed upon divine properties per se. 
Reply: Even if we reject the thesis of Divine simplicity and theistic essentialism, 
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it does not follow that worship is not best construed as a delight in the excellences 
(properties) which do constitute God. One cannot love a bare particular, a thing 
which has no properties whatever (one reason, I think, is that of metaphysical 
necessity there cannot be such ontological items). The above critic is correct that 
worship does not involve sheer disinterested delight in properties per se. First, I 
believe worship of God involves reverencing the instantiation of these properties 
in a person or person-like Being. We delight in there being a supremely wise, good 
Creator and not simply in there being a Platonic property of Good, Wise Creator-
hood. Second, we also adore the Divine lover revealed in our experience, the One 
who lovingly interacts with us in specific ways. This still does not circumvent the 
thesis that worship consists in reverent delight in supremely good or great making 
properties. The Hound of Heaven we may encounter in religious experience comes 
to us brimming over with delightful properties. 9 
By way of a final, more fanciful, reply to our critic, consider a radically 
nonessentialist theistic metaphysics. Imagine (per impossible?) God could lose 
his great making properties. Yahweh could have been a human being born and 
someone else, perhaps St. Augustine, could have been God. The roles may be 
reversed. There is a saying attributed to St. Augustine which allows this to be 
metaphysically possible. "0 my God, if I were God and thou Augustine, I would 
wish that thou wert God and I Augustine." 10 We may consider the moral character 
of worship in a Rawlsian framework." Let us introduce a veil of ignorance. 
Consider both Yahweh and Augustine qua rational creatures neither knowing 
which will tum out to be God. Would worship still be endorsed as appropriate 
so that Augustine and Yahweh would be content to endorse it independent of 
who will be the lucky one to wind up as God? Although this thought experiment 
already seems to me well beyond what can be settled with ease, I believe worship 
as I understand it would be so endorsed behind the veil. The delighting in 
wisdom, creative power and knowledge seems to me a real good. This need in 
no way involve endorsing an egoistic vanity. Presumably one would desire that 
the person who winds up as God be given over to loving and delighting in the 
creature. Yahweh is not vain; if He had Augustine's position and Augustine His 
He would engage in divine worship without resentment. At the least, we have 
no reason now to think He would not do so. 
My own preference is to stick to Anselmian convictions about theistic essen-
tialism. I merely offer the above, fanciful Rawlsian story to defend the property-
eyed view of worship against a nonAnselmian critic. 
Does the Christian account of Salvation history suggest God is vain? 
Redemption 
The last charge of the objection from vanity I discuss concerns the Christian 
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account of salvation or redemption. The centrality of Christ may suggest to the 
critic a prima donna god who cannot bear to allow creatures to effect their own 
salvation. There is a peculiarity in the Gospel accounts of Jesus' sayings. On 
the one hand He is humble of heart and on the other He attributes to Himself a 
title and centrality unequalled in human literature. Who has insisted with such 
emphasis and force upon His centrality to the cosmos as the Christ of St. John's 
gospel? Christian claims about Jesus range from cosmology to the deepest recesses 
of our personality. In all such matters, Christ is to be in the limelight. 
I believe the answer to this charge rests, in part, upon what I noted above 
about creation and worship. If the motivation for creation need not involve 
narcissistic vanity, neither need the motivation for the re-creation of life in 
redemption. 
There is not space here to outline in much detail the competing theories of 
the atonement. The major theories insist that human creatures are unable to effect 
a full atonement (at-one-ment, in Anglo-Saxon) with God, owing to willful 
self-regard. The competing theories have different accounts of this inability. The 
Anselmian theory is that humans cannot effect atonement because they cannot 
satisfy Divine justice; the Abelardian theory is that humans are so self-centered 
and bent upon cruelty that only a God-indwelt Christ could shock us out of moral 
and spiritual bondage; the ransom theory is that humans have become captive 
to Satan by their ill-doing and only Christ can overcome that powerful Demonic 
Master. As with creation, God alone is in a position to effect the re-creation of 
life, a restoration, or bringing about for the first time, a life of moral and spiritual 
health. There is some debate in the Christian tradition as to what means God 
was able to use in effecting redemption. Some means would seem to be unavail-
able (e.g., means which involve God's doing violence to innocent creatures, 
and so on), but, on all the competing theories, there was a fittingness to God's 
effecting it through incarnation. Does the atonement via incarnation itself suggest 
vanity? The critic may charge that God cannot leave humanity alone, but egoism 
prompts Him to take on human flesh as well. 
The incarnation or enfleshment of God need not suggest egoism. There is as 
little suggestion of vanity here as there is in cases of a human lover who longs 
for and achieves unity with her beloved. But two Christian tenets make it harder 
to make a case for improper Divine egoism: the teaching of human divinization, 
and understanding the incarnation as a kind of Divine limiting. 
The early Christian notion of divinization has received scant attention in Anglo-
American philosophy. In one of the Petrine epistles we read that we are to 
become "partakers of the divine nature" (II Peter 1 :4, RSV). In the fourth Gospel 
it is said that we are to be one with Christ as Christ is one with the Father. It 
is difficult to make sense of this within a theistic metaphysics, though William 
Alston in a recent paper "The Indwelling of :he Holy Spirit," has advanced some 
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intriguing suggestions of what may be involved epistemically, namely immediate 
divine-human cognitive access. 12 However this is spelled out, from an ethical 
standpoint the notion of divinization brings to light a problem with the vanity 
objection. God does not seek to absorb other creatures, but to have them be so 
linked with Him and He with them, that their action is harmonious and inextricably 
bound together. Recall Jesus' dictum that whoever harms or benefits the most 
vulnerable, hanns or benefits Himself (Matthew 25:40,41). The conjoinment of 
wills and intent in a divine-human united life is to be one of creativity and rich 
in value. The divine human identification is to be so tight as to rule out any 
narrow self-interest or egoism. God's will is for the flourishing of all, in great, 
ever increasing plenitude. If we are to imagine taking pleasure in oneself in such 
a relationship it would be to take pleasure in God, and to take pleasure in God 
would be to take pleasure in God's whole creation. As we are said to dwell in 
God, God is said to dwell in us and share joy and sorrow. At the heart of most 
plausible accounts of altruism and compassion there is emphasis upon one person 
being affected and shaped by the well being of another. Your plight is of distress 
to me; you delight in some of my joys. Such sharing and extension of personal 
concern suggests a richly generous life. 13 Presumably the mutual regard in Divine 
human life would be heightened considerably beyond the intimacy of any solely 
human relationships. The psychology of egoism is not in evidence. 
While the Christian understanding of the incarnation suggests to the critic a 
vain God who cannot leave anyone alone, it can also suggest a startling image 
of self-limiting love. In sin creatures are bereft of God and one another and, ex 
hypothesi (given any of the plausible theories of the atonement), in need of 
Divine action to effect a healing. The divine enfleshment may be understood as 
a way to enhance the scope of human freedom and rich interplay with the 
supernatural. This means of grace can be thought of as a marked self-limiting 
of God. In a well known passage in Philippians we read that Christ did not count 
equality with a God a thing to be grasped but humbled Himself to take on the 
fonn of a servant. 
There is not space to advance much of a Christology here. Suffice it to note 
that any of the current, plausible Christian theories of the incarnation endeavor 
to make some sense of the God-man living a life under considerably more limited 
conditions than the unincarnate God prior to incarnation. 11 In Goods and Virtues 
Michael Siote comments that humility seems to be of greater value, or to be 
more wonderful, the more that it is embraced by persons of greater traits and 
character. Thus: 
But however we are ultimately to analyze humility, it follows from the 
little we have already said that humility is (in the sense intended) a 
dependent virtue. For intuitively it seems to attain its full status as a 
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virtue or desirable trait of character only when accompanied by other 
desirable traits. It is a positive virtue only in someone we have other 
reasons to think well of. In addition, humility can seem more wonderful, 
more admirable, the more highly we regard someone's other traits; ... '5 
If this is correct, then surely the self limiting of Christ with respect to knowledge 
and power, His coming to live as a human being in order to effect at-onement 
with creatures and creator might well be an act of extraordinary humility. Indeed, 
if we understand Divine omniscience as knowing all truths and yet claim the 
second member of the trinity so limited his knowledge in the earthly life as to 
embrace finite life, the Divine cognitive limiting might well be said to be infinite. 
Surely the Divine limiting and the supremely redemptive willingness to be subject 
to betrayal, hatred and physical suffering may be understood as God embracing 
a humbled role. The God who comes to us as a servant does not strike one 
naturally as the god of Narcissus. 
In concluding, I concede that for all I have suggested in reply to my imagined 
critic, at best I have shown that the vanity objection lacks clear force. There are 
ways to meet the objection. We may succeed in reading the notions of incarnation 
and divinization in salvation history as involving a real humbling of Godhead. 
Divine creation and worship are instances of proper pride, not vanity. Moreover, 
we may appeal to tenets in Christianity which appear to portray God as not in 
any way having defects which prompt you and me to vain pride, viz. low 
self-image, a need to show off and so on. The critic may still persist, and her 
persistence may stem from a sound, penetrating psychoanalysis of evil. Evil has 
many faces. But the critic's persistence may also stem from lack of appreciating 
the subtleties of the good. 16 
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